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CHAPTER ONE
SEARCHES WITHOUT WARRANTS
Jerold Israel*

Basis of the Warrant Requirement
Although they are surely well-known to this
audience, I take note at the outset of two basic
principles that are the foundation for all that
follows. First, under Ker v. California,! fourth
amendment standards governing the constitutionality
of searches are applicable to the states, and the
states must, at a minimum~ meet those standards. The
states can impose a more restrictive standard, but
they cannot impose a more lenient standard. Second,
evidence obtained by a search which does not meet
federal constitutional standards will not be admissible
at trial. For many years there was some question in
Michigan about the exclusion of certain types of
evidence found outside dwellings, due to a special
exception found in the Michigan Constitution.2 That
exception has now been laid to rest in the Pennington

*
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2.

Professor of Law, The University of Michigan
Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
374 u.s. 23 (1963).
Mich. Canst. 1963, Art. 1, §ll: " ••• The provisions of this section shall not be construed to
bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any
narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any
other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer
outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in
this state."
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case.

3

My primary area of concentration today is the
search made without a warrant. Studies indicate that
95 percent or more of all searches are without warrants.
It is quite understandable, then, that most
of the search-and-seizure litigation concerns the
validity of searches without warrants.
The fourth amendment has two conjunctive clauses.
The first guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches, and the second sets forth the
conditions under which a warrant may issue. Only
the second clause specifically refers to warrants.
There has been considerable controversy over the years
concerning the relationship between those two clauses.
That relationship has been a source of division within both the United States Supreme Court and the Michigan appellate courts. One group of judges and justices has argued that the amendment does not create
a special presumption favoring warrants:
the first
clause imposes a single, basic standard--reasonableness--and that standard can be readily met with or
without a warrant. Another group of judges and justices has argued that the two clauses are closely
related and the second clause referring to warrants
largely defines the reasonableness requirement of the
first.
Michigan decisions have generally tended to
favor the former view.4 Opinions have been concerned
primarily with the presence of probable cause, not
with the failure of the officer to obtain a warrant.
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court,
in the last few years, has definitely favored the
latter approach, emphasizing the need for obtaining
a warrant even where probable cause is clearly established.
Illustrative is Justice Stewart's statement

3.
4.

People v. Pennington, 383 Mich. 611 (1970), rev'g
17 Mich. App. 398 (1969).
See e.g., People v. Cook, 24 Mich. App. 40~
(1970).
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in Katz v. United States 5 :
••• this Court has never sustained
a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence
of a particular crime and voluntarily
confined their activities to the least
intrusive means consistent with that end.
Searches conducted without warrants have
been held unlawful "notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause, ••• "
for the Constitution requires "that the
deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer ••• be interposed between the
citizen and the police •••• " ••• "Over and
over again this Court has emphasized that
the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment
requires adherence to judicial processes",
••• and that searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
Although the United States Supreme Court is
divided on this issue, Justice Stewart's position
appears to be prevailing and it is, therefore, the
view to which counsel must adapt their arguments. In
particular, prosecutors, in defending searches without
warrants, must be prepared to bring such searches
within the "specifically established and well-delineated exceptions," noted Stewart, rather than simply
point to the "general reasonableness" of the officer's
action without particular regard for the lack of a
warrant.
Although Justice Stewart refers to a "few
5.

389

u.s.

347, 356-7 (1967).
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specifically established and well-delineated exceptions," there are several such exceptions justifying
searches without a warrant. Most are well-established,
but how well they are delineated is a matter of some
debate. The search incident to an arrest is the most
frequently used exception. Another is the moving
vehicle exception, although it is probably best
classified as one illustration of a larger category,
the search without a warrant justified by "exigent
circumstances." Another in this category is the
search in the process of hot pursuit of a wanted
person. Another exception is the custodial search.
Included in this category are the inventory search
of the person at the station and the search of the
impounded vehicle. Consent to search also justifies
lack of a warrant. Of course, if there is voluntary
consent, the state need not show even probable cause.
Similarly, there are those investigations that are
not characterized as searches, such as observation,
which may lead directly to seizure of material in
open view (which also does not require a warrant) •
Rather than explore each exception in all of
its applications, I would like to consider warrantless searches of three basic "subjects"--the person,
the car, and the building (whether office or home)-and examine the application of the relevant exceptions
(excluding consent, which Judge Reisig will cover)
to the search of each.

Search of the Person
Stop and Fl'isk
Let us start with the search of the person.
First, consider the possible bearing of the last
exception noted previously--investigative activities
that are not treated as full-fledged searches. Most
significant here is the so-called 1'frisk" of the
person. The constitutionality of the frisk was
established in Tel'l'Y v. Ohio.6 A police officer
6.

392

u.s.

1 (1968).
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observed three men in a downtown shopping area engaged in what he believed was the ''casing" of a
store for robbery. He approached them for questioning. But after an initial mumbled response, he
frisked them; that is, he engaged in a "pat down."
He felt a pistol in a breast pocket and removed a
loaded weapon, which was introduced as evidence at
trial. The officer obviously did not have a warrant
and he could not justify his action as a search
incident to an arrest because he lacked probable
cause to make an arrest and had not made one.
The
Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the seizure of the
weapon. It stressed that the frisk was subject to
the fourth amendment, but lacked the intensity of a
full search. Accordingly, the officer did not need
full-fledged probable cause nor the warrant required
for a full-fledged search. The Court held that when
a police officer has reason to believe that the person with whom he is dealing (here, questioning) is
armed and dangerous, he may make a frisk even though
he does not have probable cause to arrest that person. He may do this for his own safety and the
safety of others but he is limited to a frisk of the
outer clothing in his attempt to discover weapons.
It is important to note that that case dealt
with authority to frisk, not with the authority to
stop. The Supreme Court left open the question of
when an officer on less than probable cause can
force a person to stop so that questions could be
asked.
In Terry itself he did not have to stop the
individuals. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion,
suggested that the Court could not logically sustain
the frisk without also sustaining the stop. His
view seems likely to prevail if the Court remains as
presently composed. Of course, if the initial stop
were invalid, then the subsequent frisk might also
fall as the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The validity of the stop may also be crucial in
sustaining another investigative technique that is
not viewed as a search and therefore does not require
a warrant. Take the case where the officer says,
"I didn't search anybody. I stopped him to ask for
an explanation of suspicious activity. He opened
up his hand. There was a packet of narcotics in plain
view, so I grabbed it." At the time the officer
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made the seizure, he clearly had probable cause and
a warrant is not needed because the officer had no
opportunity to obtain one prior to the sudden appearance of the contraband. The key here is that the
activities prior to the seizure did not violate the
fourth amendment. But if the initial stop is invalid
under the fourth amendment, the whole matter falls.
The fourth amendment does not restrict observation
of matter in plain view provided the officer has a
right to be in a position to obtain that view. An
illegal "stop" may place him outside that category.
Moreover, the material is only in plain view because
abandoned and the abandonment stems from the stop.
Assuming the validity of the stop, the frisk
still must meet the limits imposed by the Court--a
pat down for weapons, with no attempt, under Terry,
to initially thrust hands into any pockets. Only
after a weapon was felt did the officer reach into
the pocket and remove the weapon.
In this regard,
I wonder how the courts will react when someone first
demonstrates that guns don't always feel like guns.
I have seen, for example, hollowed-out wallets that
contained guns, yet feel like and have the appearance
of an ordinary, rather stuffed wallet. Someday an
officer is going to remove such a wallet, open it,
and find that it contained marijuana, stolen jewels
or some other contraband. The prosecutor had better
be prepared to prove by exhibits that the officer
reasonably could believe a weapon might be in such
a case. Of course, this possibility, if recognized,
would significantly increase that which might be
removed in a frisk.

PeopZe v. Evans? is a case that, in a way, may
go beyond Terry.
In the early morning in Detroit,
police officers noticed a man walking rapidly down
a street with a package. He apparently spotted the
police and retreated into an alley, where they found
him crouched behind some garbage cans. They knew of
no crime that had been committed at that point. Yet
they opened his package and found partially empty
bottles of liquor. They reached into his pockets

7.

3 Mich. App. 1 (1966).
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and pulled out more bottles of liquor. They later
found that there had been a liquor store robbery and
that the liquor came from that store. Defense argued
that the search had been illegal. It was without a
warrant and not incident to any arrest, since there
was no probable cause to make an arrest and an arrest
had not been made. The Michigan Court of Appeals
said that while there was no probable cause to make
an arrest, there was probable cause to make a search
without regard to the arrest. The basis for the
lack of a warrant, I guess, was a ''moving vehicle"
type of concept. Since he was not subject to arrest
he could "move on." But even if this were accepted,
the court is not altogether convincing in showing
probable cause to search if one acknowledges lack
of probable cause to arrest. To my knowledge, Evans
has not been further developed in later cases.
SeaPch Incident to an APPest

As noted previously, the primary justification
for the warrantless search of the person is the
search-incident-to-a-valid-arrest exception. This
exception is based upon the premise that the search
must be undertaken immediately following arrest to
insure that the arrested person does not have weapons
and to prevent his possible destruction or concealment of weapons. Since the search is directed at
more than weapons, it will be far more extensive
than a frisk. But how extensive? Must the offense
for which the arrest is made be such that the officer
can believe that there is some evidence to be destroyed?
The Michigan Supreme Court has stated that when
a man is stopped for a traffic violation, e.g., a
bad headlight, ordinarily a search of the car cannot
be made.8 The officer isn't likely to find evidence
of a headlight violation or speeding violation in
the car. Neither is he likely to find such evidence
upon the driver's person, so a search of the person
incident to such a stop would also appear to be invalid. Of course, this limitation does not neces8.

People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247 (1959).
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sarily apply to all misdemeanors. There may be some
traffic offenses that justify a search of the person.
If an individual is arrested for "driving while under
the influence," he might possess evidence that could
be destroyed or concealed, such as the intoxicant
or its empty container.
Assuming that the misdemeanor is of the type
where evidence is not to be found, can the officer
at least utilize a frisk? Does the Terry standard
apply, or does the existence of the authority to
arrest itself automatically justify a frisk for
weapons? Language in GonzaZes or Terry would suggest
that, at least where the individual is not placed
in custody, the Terry standard applies. What if the
person is placed in custody--e.g., placed in the
police vehicle and taken to the station--rather than
released at the scene after issuance of an appearance
ticket? Does the officer have an automatic right
to engage in a frisk, even where the offense involved
is a misdemeanor, before placing a person in custody?
This is an open issue. Neither GonzaZes nor similar
cases deal with it. Certainly, one could not readily
conclude that all persons taken into custody, by
that fact alone, present a reasonable suspicion that
they are armed. Yet, on the other hand, the arrested
person placed in custody may be more likely to resort
to force than the person who anticipates his on-site
release. Also, the officer often is more vulnerable
to attack when the arrested person is in the police
vehicle.
Most felonies are such that evidence may be
found on the person, so problems of this sort don't
arise with felony arrests. A general search of the
person is usually justified; but how thoroughly may
the officer search? If the man, for example, is
arrested for automobile theft, can the officer look
through his wallet or a pill box found on his pers~n?
His wallet may very well contain some evidence (e.g.,
stolen registration papers), but the pill box is
presumably too small to contain even such evidence.
The courts have divided on this issue, some permitting a thorough search of everything found on the
person incident to the arrest. The Michigan appellate
courts, to my knowledge, have stated only that you
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can make a man empty his pockets upon his arrest
and take everything that is presented. In People
v. Jaokson,9 the arrested person was required to do
exactly that and the officers seized ~ lighter which
later was found to have been stolen from the robbery
victim. The court upheld the admissibility of that
evidence without any extensive discussion of the
issue.

Custodial Searoh
One relevant factor here is the validity of
the inventory or custodial search. Most persons
arrested on felonies will be placed in jail for some
period of time prior to arraignment on the warrant.
Prior to being placed in a cell, their belongings
will be removed and usually examined (i.e., pill
boxes opened, contents of wallets examined, etc.).
This is a standard practice, but it recently has
been challenged, as to permissible scope, in the
federal courts, with varying success. If the scope
of the inventory search is limited, perhaps the court
will be more willing to deal with the intensity of
the search incident to a felony arrest because, any
limitations will be more meaningful. On the other
hand, if a thorough inventory search without warrant
is justified as a necessary incident of custodial
detention, it seems likely that the courts would
also grant greater scope to searches incident to
felony arrests on the ground that the matter seized
would eventually be examined in the inventory search.
one major problem related to search incident to
arrest that has been directly answered is the requisite chronological order of the search and final
arrest. The Michigan courts have recognized that
the search is still incident to an arrest even if
the officer stops, searches, and then tells the person he is under arrest. The key is that the search
and the arrest be contemporaneous and that the officer intend to arrest from the outset.lO

9.
10.

11 Mich. App. 630 (1968).
People v. Pankin, 4 Mich. App. 19 (1966).
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Search of a Car
Let us move now to the search of the vehicle.
Here a~ain, examination that falls short of a search
will not require a warrant, or for that matter, even
probable cause. The primary technique here is the
observation of matter in plain view. (With respect
to automobiles, I know of no counterpart to the
frisk of the person.) Of course, the plain-view
doctrine requires that the officer have legitimately
been in a position that entitled him to have that
view. In most reported cases, the officer observed
matter within a car that he had stopped, but the
stops were justified by traffic law violations.ll
What if there had been no traffic violation? A
state statute authorizes an officer to demand that
a driver show his license. Can he legitimately
stop any car for this purpose? Courts have upheld
such "inspection stops" when applied to a group of
vehicles selected on a random basis, but it is
questionable whether the state can condition the
right to drive on the relinquishment of at least
that protection that would be afforded a pedestrian
before an officer could single him out for the
purpose of stopping him.l2 The issue remains open.
Some have suggested that Henpyl3 holds that all
individual vehicle stops constitute arrests and must
be justified by probable cause. In HenPy, however,
the government conceded the point, and Riosl4 indicates the issue is open. It has largely been avoided
because officers have been able, by one means or
another, to find traffic violations that justify stops.
SeaPch Incident to an APPest
When it comes to physical search of the car
without a warrant, the primary justification advanced
in prior cases has been that the search was incident

11.
12.
13.
14.

See e.~., People v. Kuntze, 371 Mich. 419 (1963).
See discussion of Terry, supPa.
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
Rios v. United States, 364 u.s. 253 (1960).
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to an arrest. As noted previously, this is limited
by the type of arrest. Traffic arrests ordinarily
do not permit searches incident thereto.
In People
v. Lee,l5 police stopped a driver for one traffic
offense and the officer requested that he get out
of the car so the officer could check the car brakes.
The officer pushed aside a cushion in the front seat
as he entered the car and found a revolver there.
The court said that because the man had violated one
traffic rule, relating to lights, that did not create
probable cause to believe that there was a violation
also relating to the brakes. Since the entry for
that purpose was illegal, the discovery of weapons
incident thereto was an invalid search (this was not
plain view, as a cushion was removed).
If the arrest is for a felony, the possibility
usually exists that evidence of the crime might be
within the possession of the arrested person. The
scope of that search is so limited, however.
Chimel
v. Californial6 suggests that the search may only
extend to the area within the person's control--the
area into which he might reach in order to grasp a
weapon or evidentiary item. This seemingly would
exclude a locked glove compartment or the trunk of
a car incident to arrest. Indeed, it might not reach
the front seat if the person has been removed from
the car when the search is made, as that area is no
longer within his in~ediate control. Thus, after
Chimel, the problem considered in cases like Foster,l1
Johnnie Mae Jones,l8 and Dombrowski 19 may no longer
be of practical significance for post-Chimel searches.
In Dombrowski the defendant was arrested and his car
was searched at that point, but the officers could
not find the key to the trunk because he had hidden
it. At the station, the key was found in the process
of a custodial search of the person. The officers
then returned to the car and opened up the trunk.
The Michigan Court of Appeals said that the officers
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

371 Mich. 573 (1963).
395 u.s. 752 (1969).
People v. Foster, 17 Mich. App. 430 (1969).
People v. Johnnie Mae Jones, 12 Mich. App.
367 (1968).
People v. Dombrowski, 10 Mich. App. 445 (1968).
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should have obtained a warrant, since the search was
no longer incident to the arrest. In Jones the
defendant was taken into custody and transported to
the station and the officers returned immediately
to search the car. The court of Appeals viewed this
as a borderline case and held the search incident
to the arrest after noting that the police were
subject to harrassment that may have prevented an
immediate search. They also noted that defendant
had not been booked. It was possible that a search
might not reveal any relevant evidence and defendant
might have been released. Since the defendant was
not present in either case, Chimel indicates neither
search could be sustained today as incident to an
arrest. Authority to search without a warrant in
such cases must come from another "exception," and
that exception is the "moving vehicle" exception
noted in Chambers v. Maroney.20

"Moving Vehiale" Exaeption
Police officers in Chambers were investigating
a recent gasoline station robbery when they stopped
a car with probable cause to believe the driver and
passengers had been involved in the robbery. But
they did not search the car at that point. They
took the men to the station and booked them, then
went back to search the car and found weapons and
stolen identification cards. The Court said the
search was not incident to arrest, but was still
justified without a warrant since the vehicle was
capable of being moved and there was therefore no
opportunity to obtain a warrant. The police had not
impounded the car and they could not be required to
do so as an alternative to the search. Although the
driver and passengers were in custody, this did not
preclude others from taking the car. The Court
stressed, however, that the search, since it was not
justified by the arrest, was based upon the existence
of probable cause relating to the car itself--probable
cause that it contained relevant evidence, since it
apparently had been used in the robbery only a few
hours before. Probable cause relating to the car will
not exist in all cases involving felony arrests. In
20.

399

u.s.

42 (1970).

SEARCHES WITHOUT WARRANTS I 13
PeopZe v. Carter, 21 the Michigan appellate court
indicated that Chambers would apply to an automobile
that had apparently been used in the robbery several
hours before. Although there had been some opportunity to remove contraband, probable cause to believe
that the car contained contraband would still exist.
But what if there had been no evidence that the car
had been used in the robbery? Can we ordinarily
assume that it is a logical place to have loot
stored, as would be the horne? What if the crime does
not involve loot (e.g., a rape) and did not occur
in the car? Can we nevertheless treat it as a likely
source of evidence, such as fingerprints or footprints
that might match those found at the scene of the
crime? Also, how much time may elapse before the
search is undertaken? In Carter, the officers
waited three days after initially seizing the car.
The justification for the lack of warrant in
Maroney was the possible removal of the car, but
this delay in the search certainly indicated no such
concern. The officers had ample time to obtain a
warrant, and the court of appeals stated Chambers,
therefore,would not apply (reversal was not required,
however, because admission of the evidence seized
was harmless error). The same difficulty might arise
when the officers had ample time to obtain a warrant
before they sought out a car to be searched. For
example, what if, in Chambers, they had been aware
of Mr. Chambers' involvement in the crime several
days before they stopped him, but had failed to
obtain a warrant to search the car? Can they now
justify a search without a warrant on the ground
that their "hand" has now been "tipped," and the
car might be removed before they can get the warrant?
CustodiaZ Examination of a Car
One other significant exception to the warrant
requirement is the custodial examination of a car.
If the car is impounded, i.e., it is seized as police
property subject to forfeiture as in narcotics cases,
then it is in police custody and a subsequent search
without a warrant may be justified, though days later,

21.

28 Mich. App. 83 (1970).
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22
on an inventory theory.
The CoopeP case was
extended in People v. Cook23 to an automobile that
had been impounded as the instrumentality utilized
in a child molesting offense. The court there argued,
in effect, that since the entire car was seized as
evidence, the more thorough examination at a later
date did not constitute a new search. The crucial
issue was the authority to seize the car and that
was justified by probable cause that it had been
used in the offense. I wonder how far the court
will carry this doctrine. Certainly, it would not
be applied to a "seizure" of a house in which an
offense occured at the time of arrest and then a
subsequent search of the house without a warrant. A
crucial aspect in Cook may be that the subsequent
"search" was no more than the removal of fingerprints
found on various portions of the car. In both Cook
and CoopeP, the utilization of the car in the commission of a felony to which the evidence related
was important. The D.C. Court of Appeals has held
that contraband found in a car impounded following
a minor traffic offense was not admissible.24
The limitations of the ChambePs doctrine as
well as CoopeP are indicated by the Supreme Court
decision in Coolidge v. New HampshiPe,25 which came
after this lecture was delivered.
In that case, the
police had obtained probable cause to believe that
the defendant had murdered a young female. They
did obtain a warrant authorizing search of the car,
before they went to defendant's house, where he was
arrested. The car was located in the driveway at
the time. It was subsequently towed to the police
station and there searched. Vacuum sweepings from
the car were introduced into evidence at trial. The
warrant was held to be invalid since it was not
issued by "a neutral and detached magistrate," but
rather by the state attorney general, who was acting
in his capacity as a "justice of the peace.'' A
majority of the Court also held that the search could

22.
23.
24.
25.

See Cooper v. California, 386 u.s. 58 (1967).
24 Mich. App. 401 (1970).
Mayfield v. United States,9 Cr. Law Rptr. 2115
(1971).
399 u.s. 926 (1970).
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not be justified without a warrant. The major
opinion on this issue was joined by only four justices. They rejected application of the Chambers
decision on the ground that the police had known of
the probable role of the car for some time, the
petitioner had had ample opportunity to destroy any
incriminating evidence in the car, the house had
been guarded at the time of the arrest, and the
petitioner and his spouse had been denied any access
to the car. The prosecution also sought to argue
that the car had been seized as a matter in plain
view, presumably as an instrument of the crime, and
that the subsequent search was therefore valid. The
four justices argued, however, that the plain-view
doctrine could not be applied to the seizure of the
car as a whole. This was not a case where the police
officer inadvertently carne across evidence in the
process of an otherwise valid search. Here again
the justices emphasized that the police had ample
opportunity to obtain a warrant; they knew the automobile's exact description and location well in
advance; they had intended to seize it when they
first came upon defendant's property; and the car
was not contraband or stolen goods or an object dangerous in itself. The fifth justice, Justice Harlan,
concurred in the conclusion that the search could
not be justified without a warrant, but did not join
in all of the reasoning of the plurality opinion.
He did state, however, that a ''contrary result in
this case would, I fear, go far towards relegating
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment to
a position of little consequence in federal search
and seizure law, a course which seems to be opposite
to the one we took in ChimeZ."

Search of a Building
Let me now turn to the third area of concern-the search of the building. Here again, almost all
of the exceptions noted previously will come into
play. Plain view will be a significant justification,
but, again, its validity depends upon a lawful initial entry into the house that placed the officer
in a position to have that plain view. In this area,
perhaps the most significant current question is
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whether officers may enter a house for the purpose
of making an arrest without previously having obtained an arrest warrant, despite the fact that
opportunity to obtain the warrant was present. The
Michigan Court of Appeals suggested that an arrest
warrant will not be necessary in such a situation.2 6
The issue was recently noted by the United States
Supreme Court in Coolidge, with the majority indicating that it was an 1'open" issue.
Assuming that we have a "full-fledged search"
rather than an observation justified under the plainview doctrine, there is very limited scope for a
search without a warrant. Under the Chimel case, as
previously noted, the search, if justified as incident to an arrest, is limited to the area within the
immediate control of the arrestee. Presumably this
frequently would not even extend to a bookshelf or
desk located across the room. Of course, if the
arrestee is permitted to go into another room, or
to open a drawer (e.g., for the purpose of removing
clothing) the ~alice may search that area prior to
such activity. 7
So far, the court has been unwilling, with
respect to the homes, to recognize a doctrinal counterpart of the moving vehicle exception--an exception
justifying search of a home without a warrant when
there is a possibility that another returning to the
home would seize any evidence located there before
the officers could obtain a warrant. This issue was
presented, at least in part, in the Vale case.28
In that case, petitioner was arrested on the porch,
and his house was subsequently searched. The attempt
to justify the search as incident to the arrest was
easily rejected, even though the search occurred
before Chimel and therefore was not subject to that
ruling. Justice Black, in dissent, argued that the
police should have been permitted to search the
house on the thesis that Vale's mother and brother
26.

See People v. Herrera, 19 Mich. App. 216 (1969).
But aompare Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d

27.
28.

See People v. Giacalone, 23

385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Vale v. Louisiana, 399

u.s.

Mich. App. 163 (1970).
30 (1970).
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had arrived shortly after the arrest and were aware
of Vale's arrest for an alleged narcotics transfer.
Presumably, they would also be aware of narcotics
in the home and could destroy such narcotics while
the police officers were obtaining a warrant. The
majority did not respond directly to this point,
although they did note that at the time the officers
first entered the premises, and presumably began the
search, the mother and brother had not yet arrived.
Certainly, a reasonable implication of the opinion
is that the officers should have either prevented
the mother and brother from entering the home until
they could obtain a warrant, or one officer might
have remained with the mother and brother while they
sought the warrant. While one might argue that the
same procedures could often be applied to automobile
searches, the court's opinions indicate that they
do not view privacy within the automobile as nearly
as significant as that within the home.
If Vale had evaded arrest on the front porch
and had gone into the home, the police officers
presumably could have followed him "in hot pursuit"
and might have seized any item which they found in
plain view. Indeed, under Warden v. Hayden,29 they
presumably could have searched for any weapons which
might be seized while they were in the process of
looking for him.
In Warden, in the pursuit of a
suspect, an officer looked inside a washing machine,
apparently to find weapons, and discovered a bloody
shirt,which he seized.
In the Carter case, the
officers,while pursuing a fleeing felon, seized a
pair of red shoes smeared with white paint and a
brown paper sack containing money. However, the
court there excluded evidence which was seized after
the officers had made a determination that the suspect had left the building and the apartment was
properly secured by officers. At that time, before
conducting a further search, they should have obtained a warrant.
Much more could be said concerning the search
of the building. Because of the shortage of time,

29.

387

u.s.

294 (1967).

18 / SEARCHES WITHOUT WARRANTS
I have not treated it as extensively as the search
of a person or the automobile. A general rule, one
can safely say, is that the likelihood of justifying
a search o;f a building without a warrant is far less
than that of justifying a warrantless search either
of the person or of the automobile.

